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This paper examines the equilibrium of location of N vertically-linked firms. In a spatial 
economy composed of two regions, a monopolist firm supplies an input to N consumer goods 
firms that compete in quantities. It was concluded that, when there are increases in the 
transport cost of the input, downstream firms prefer to agglomerate in the region where the 
upstream firm is located, in order to obtain savings in the production cost. On the other hand, 
increases in the general transport cost or in the number of downstream firms lead to a 
dispersion of these firms, in order to reduce competition and locate closer to the final 
consumer.  
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1 – Introduction 
 
In the absence of labour mobility, the agglomeration of productive activity results from 
interactions between firms. As noted by MARSHALL (1920), these interactions can take the 
form of an exchange of intermediate goods. In this case, the saving in the transport cost of 
intermediate goods is a powerful incentive for the agglomeration of vertically-linked firms. 
 
In the literature that addresses this issue, the locational interaction of vertically-linked firms is 
modelled in the following way. There are two regions where the firms can locate, and an 
imperfectly competitive upstream industry supplies an intermediate good to the downstream 
industry, whose firms produce a final consumer good and can be either perfectly or 
imperfectly competitive. As far as the upstream industry is concerned, its market structure can 
be a Cournot oligopoly, as in AMITI (2001) and BELLEFLAMME and TOULEMONDE 
(2003), exhibit the characteristics of Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition, as in FUJITA 
and HAMAGUCHI (2001), FUJITA and THISSE (2002) and VENABLES (1996), or it can 
contain only a single monopolist firm, as in PONTES (2003) and PONTES (2005). As far as 
the downstream industry is concerned, AMITI (2001), FUJITA and HAMAGUCHI (2001) 
and FUJITA and THISSE (2002) assume that this is perfectly competitive, while 
VENABLES (1996) and BELLEFLAMME and TOULEMONDE (2003) make the opposite 
assumption. 
 
Under this framework, there are some effects that may lead to the dispersion or agglomeration 
of firms. According to VENABLES (1996), in vertically-linked industries, the downstream 
constitutes the market for the upstream, thus creating an incentive for the location of upstream 
firms in a region where there is a significant number of downstream firms. This effect is 
called the demand linkage between firms. At the same time, the downstream firms incur lower 
production costs if they locate close to the upstream firms, since they save the transport cost 
of the input. This is referred to as the cost linkage between firms. Combining the cost and 
demand linkages, a centripetal force appears, inducing the creation of an industrial cluster in 
one of the regions. According to PONTES (2005), the strength of the cost linkage is 
proportional to the transport cost of the input. On the other hand, the dispersion of final 
consumer demand, together with the competition effect, creates a centrifugal force leading to 
the dispersion of firms, in order to locate closer to local final consumers and simultaneously 
relax intra-regional competition. According to PONTES (2005), the incentive to disperse is 
greater when the transport cost of the final good is higher. The overall balance between these 
two forces is then responsible for the existence, the number of firms and the stability of the 
geographical equilibrium of location. Changes in the parameters that affect this spatial 
economy can lead to significant changes in this equilibrium. 
 
In this context, in their locational decisions, the downstream firms must take into account the 
trade-off between the geographical point that minimizes the production cost (which is affected 
by the transport cost of the input) and the geographical point that maximizes accessibility to 
the final consumer. MAYER (2000) concluded that this locational decision is based more on 
the former than on the latter, since variations in the production cost affect all final consumers 
while variations in accessibility to the final consumer (which may be reduced through an 
increase in the transport cost of the final good), affect only part of them. The general literature 
concludes that agglomeration occurs when the transport cost of the intermediate good is high 
in relation to the transport cost of the final good, and dispersion may occur if the proportion 
between these two costs is lowered (FUJITA and HAMAGUCHI, 2001).   
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According to PONTES (2005), a common assumption in this literature is that the transport 
costs of the input and of the final good vary independently, but a more real assumption is to 
consider that they vary in proportion to one another, since they are both influenced by the 
general quality of the transport and communication infrastructure. 
 
In this paper, a monopolist firm supplies an intermediate good to N downstream firms that 
compete in quantities à la Cournot in the market for the final good. According to MAYER 
(2000), the literature about locational strategies involves models in which the competition is 
oligopolistic à la Bertrand and models in which it is oligopolistic à la Cournot. This latter kind 
of model is more realistic since it involves overlapping markets with the existence of intra-
regional trade and the equilibrium of agglomeration of firms tends to occur in a central region, 
as in the real world. In the spatial economy assumed in this paper, firstly the firms select their 
locations simultaneously. Then, the upstream monopolist firm selects the delivered price of 
the input and, finally, the downstream firms take this price as given and compete among 
themselves, establishing the quantities to be supplied in each market. The transport costs of 
the input and the final good vary in proportion to one another. 
 
This paper follows the analysis made in a paper by PONTES (2005), in which a similar model 
of vertically-linked industries was presented. In contrast with the former, this model develops 
a generalized model for the case in which all downstream firms are producing for both 
regions, allowing for the existence of N firms in the downstream industry instead of only the 
case of a duopoly. This generalization allows for a more realistic watch on the effects of 
downstream competition. Also, unlike the former paper, which only assessed whether or not 
there existed full agglomeration equilibrium of firms for different values of transport costs, 
this paper attempts to characterize the full set of equilibria of the location game. 
 
Basically, when faced with increases in the transport cost of the input, downstream firms 
prefer to agglomerate in the region where the upstream firm is located in order to obtain 
savings in the production cost. On the other hand, increases in the transport cost of the final 
good lead to a dispersion of downstream firms, in order to reduce competition and locate 
close to the final consumer. Furthermore, it is not possible for there to exist a large industrial 
cluster in the region where the upstream firm is not located, showing the difficulty that 
countries with a less developed upstream industry have in being an attractive location for an 
industrial cluster. The structure of the paper is divided in the following manner: in section 2, 
the hypothesis of the model and a three-stage noncooperative game is presented; in section 3, 
we present the results of the model applied to the case of a spatial economy with fifty 
downstream firms; in section 4, we draw our conclusions. 
 
2 – The model 
 
2.1 – Hypothesis 
 
1 – There are two symmetrical regions labelled A and B, each with the same number of final 
consumers; 
 
2 – There are two vertically-linked industries. The downstream industry produces a 
homogeneous final good, employing a linear technology, which means that in order to 
produce one unit of the final good, it uses one unit of the intermediate good, which is supplied 
by the upstream industry. There is only one firm in the upstream industry, labelled firm 1, and 
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this monopolist firm selects the delivered price wk (k = a, b), which maximizes its profit. 
There are N firms in the downstream industry, where N is an even number, and they compete 
in quantities à la Cournot. Each firm has to select in which of the two regions to locate its 
production plant. Once this selection has been made, the downstream industry is partitioned 
into two subsets, each of them with its typical firm i ∈  A; j ∈ B, and each region contains a 
number of downstream firms );;,(, ∅=∩=∪= babak NNNNNbakN . Independently of 
their location, the downstream firms supply each region. The quantity sold by a final producer 
i (i = 1, 2, …, N) in region k (k = a, b) is given by qik. The total quantity of the final good sold 













3 – The firms in both industries do not have fixed costs, and the marginal cost of downstream 
firms is constant and equal to the price of the intermediate good (input) w, defined by the 
upstream firm, whose marginal cost is also constant and equal to c; 
 
4 – In each region, each final consumer has a linear demand function and the price in each 
region is given by 1;1 <−= kkk QQp ; 
 
5 – Each firm transports and delivers its own product and the transport cost per unit of 
distance per unit of product is given by t for the final good and by γ for the intermediate good, 
where γ ∈  (0, 1); 
 
6 – The location decision is taken simultaneously by all the firms, so no firm has any 
information relating to the location of the other firms before it has taken its decision; 
 
Without loss of generality, it is assumed that c = 0. 
 
Based on these assumptions, this economy can be modelled through a three-stage game: in the 
first stage, the firms simultaneously select their locations; in the second stage, the upstream 
monopolist firm selects the delivered price of the input; and, in the third stage, the 
downstream firms take this price as given and compete among themselves, defining the 
quantities to be supplied in each market. The game is solved by backward induction. 
 
2.2 – Solving the model 
 
In the solution of the model, without any loss of generality, all the equations were defined 
while taking into account the fact that the upstream firm is located in region A. The full set of 
calculations is available to interested readers and may be obtained from the corresponding 
author upon request. 
 
2.2.1 – 3rd stage of the game: defining the quantities to be supplied in each market 
 
The profit function of a typical downstream firm Ai∈  is given by: 
 
( ) ( ) ibaibibiaaiaiadi qtwQqqwQq −−−−+−−−= −− 11π  (1) 
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The profit function of a typical downstream firm Bj∈  is given by: 
 
( ) ( ) jbbjbjbjabjajadj qwQqqtwQq −−−+−−−−= −− 11π  (2) 
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Two systems of equations are originated. The first one is obtained from (3) and (5), the 
solution of which gives: 
 







twNNwNNq baja  (7) 
 







twNNwNNq baia  (8) 
 
The second system of equations is obtained from (4) and (6), the solution of which gives: 
 







wNNtwNNq bajb  (9) 
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wNNtwNNq baib  (10) 
 
Observing equations (7) to (10), it can be seen that: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )twwNNfqqqq bajbjaibia ;;;;;;; **** ∆=  
 
where N is a constant that depends on the number of downstream firms, whose value is 
previously defined at the beginning of the problem. So: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )twwNfqqqq bajbjaibia ;;;;;; **** ∆=  
 
As ( )tfww ba ;; γ= , a result that will be presented later, we have: 
 
( ) ( )tNfqqqq jbjaibia ;;;;; **** γ∆=  
 
2.2.2 – 2nd stage of the game: selection of the prices wa and wb by the monopolist 
upstream firm 
 
Proposition 1: the upstream firm always selects the region with the larger number of 
downstream firms. 
 
Proof: If a large number of downstream firms is located in region A, for example, a change of 
location by the upstream firm to region B is never profitable because, since the larger number 
of downstream firms is located in A, the input demand in region A is higher than the demand 
in region B. If the upstream firm moves from region A to region B, it has to address the same 
input demand as in region A, whilst bearing an additional transport cost, since, according to 
hypothesis 5, each firm is responsible for the transport of its own product. 
 
Assuming the upstream firm is located in region A (without any loss of generality), its profit 
function is given by: 
 
( ) ( )( ) bjbjabaibiaau NqqtwNqqw +−++= γπ 1  
 
Substituting the equations obtained in (7) to (10) of the previous section: 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )








































( ) ( ) ( )[ ]( ){



















Maximizing the profit in the above equation in relation to price aw : 
 






12442401  (11) 
 
Maximizing the profit function in relation to the price bw : 
 







∂ 242424401  (12) 
 
From equations (11) and (12), we obtain a system of equations, the solution of which defines 
the expressions of aw  e bw  as being: 
 
42
1* twa −=  (13) 
 
( )ttwb γ224
1* +−=  (14) 
 
Based on equations (13) and (14), the prices of the intermediate good (input) are independent 
of the number of downstream firms located in each region. They only depend on the transport 
costs. So, ( )tfww ba ;; γ= , which confirms that ( ) ( )tNfqqqq jbjaibia ;;;;; **** γ∆= , as was 
mentioned in the previous section. 
 
Moreover, equations (13) and (14) are in keeping with the expressions obtained for the input 
prices in PONTES (2005) in his model, developed for the case of only two downstream firms. 
The independence between the input prices and the number of downstream firms located in 
each region is also in accordance with the result obtained in BELLEFLAMME and 
TOULEMONDE (2003), where the equilibrium input prices were independent of the product 
variety selection made by the final producers.  
Substituting equations (13) and (14) in equations (7) to (10), we obtain: 
 
From equation (7): 
 


































γγ  (15) 
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From equation (8): 
 


































γ  (16) 
 
From equation (9): 
 


































γγ  (17) 
 
From equation (10): 
 


































γ  (18) 
 
Now that the final expressions of the parameters ****** ;;;;; bajbjaibia wwqqqq  have been obtained, 
it is necessary to establish boundary conditions in order to ensure the validity of the model, 
i.e. conditions that ensure positive input prices: 
 
0; ** >ba ww  
 
As well as conditions that ensure that both typical firms Ai∈  and Bj∈  are producing and 
supplying each region: 
  
0;;; **** >jbjaibia qqqq  
 




10* <⇒>−⇒> ttwa  
 







10* −>⇒>+−⇒> γγ  
 
As it was defined above that 2<t , this means that [ )2;0∈t , and the previous expression 
becomes 0>γ , a condition that allows for the complete use of hypothesis 5, namely 
( )1;0∈γ . 
 
From equation (16): 
 
( )( )[ ] 02120* >+∆−++⇒> γNNtqia  
 






















NNt ∆∀∀∀≥⇒ ;;,0 γ  
 
From equation (17): 
 
( ) ( )( )[ ] 022120* >−∆++−+⇒> γγ NNtq jb  
 
In the previous expression, the term inside square brackets ([]) can assume positive values in 
the interval [ )NN ;0∈∆  and can assume positive or negative values in the interval 
[ )0;NN −∈∆ . Based on this, we obtain two possible equations from equation (17): 
 






















































NNt ∆∀∀∀≥⇒ ;;,0 γ  
 
From these two possible equations obtained from equation (17), we obtained the result 0≥t  
because the case where [ )NN ;0∈∆  was the only one considered. We only considered this 
case because, as will be shown later on, the variable N∆  only has non-negative values.  
 
From equation (18): 
 
































From equation (15): 
 
( ) ( )( )[ ] 022320* >+∆+++−⇒> γγ NNtq ja  
 



























From the conditions 0;;; **** >jbjaibia qqqq , we obtain: 
 














( ) ( ) ( ) [ ) [ )+∞∈∈∆∈< ;2;;0;1;0** NNNforqtqt ibja γ  
 
the previous inequality is observed for any value in the interval [ )NN ;0∈∆ , since inside this 
interval, for ( )1;0∈γ  and [ )+∞∈ ;2N , the denominator of equation (21) always has higher 
values than the denominator of equation (20). Consequently, the values of parameter t 
obtained from equation (21) are always smaller when compared to its values obtained from 
equation (20). 
 
It is important to emphasize that at the border NN =∆ , where all the downstream firms are 
located in the same region (in the case of this model, in region A), equations (2), (15) and (17) 
do not make any sense and will be ignored. In this case, the boundary condition that defines 
the interval for parameter t where the model holds validity derives only from equations (16) 
and (18) and we therefore have: 
 




















It can be seen that the result obtained in equation (23) does not depend on the number of 
downstream firms in the economy. This result is also in accordance with the one obtained in 
PONTES (2005) in order to define the condition under which the only two existing 
downstream firms are located in region A (where the upstream firm is also located) and, at the 
same time, supply both regions. 
 
Since the boundary conditions that ensure the validity of the model have been defined, we re-





From equation (1), which defines the profit function of a typical firm Ai∈ : 
 
( ) ( ) ibajbbibaiaajabiaadi qtwqNqNqwqNqN −−−−+−−−= 11π  
 



















































Solution of A: 
 
( )( )[ ]
( )
































Solution of B: 
 

















NNtNN γγ  







⇒ γγγγ  
 























Solution of F: 















NNt γ  





Solution of C: 
 
( )( )[ ]
( )
































Solution of D: 
 
( ) ( )( )[ ]
( )








































NtNttNtNtNNtttN γγ  
 







NNt γ  
 
Solution of H: 
 















NNt γ  
 
Putting together and adding the expressions F and H, we obtain the final equation for the 
profit function of a typical firm Ai∈ : 
 
( )( )[ ]
( )













































π  (24) 
 
From equation (2), which defines the profit function of a typical firm Bj∈ : 
 
( ) ( ) jbbjbbibajabjabiaadj qwqNqNqtwqNqN −−−+−−−−= 11π  
 



















































In the previous expression, the solution of A, B, C and D brings us the same results as those 























Solution of F: 
 















NNt γγ  
 
Solution of G: 
 
( )



















Solution of H: 
 















NNt γγ  
 
Adding the expressions F and H, we obtain the final equation for the profit function of a 
typical firm Bj ∈ : 
 











γγγγπ  (25) 





2.2.3 – 1st stage of the game: interior equilibrium 
 
As far as interior equilibrium is concerned, i.e. for the interval [ )NN ;0∈∆ , the equilibrium 
condition for the location of the downstream firms (assuming constant values of Nt ,,γ ) is 
given by: 
 
( ) ( )NN djdi ∆=∆ ππ  (26) 
 
If ( ) ( )NN djdi ∆>∆ ππ , firms prefer region A and there is an incentive for the migration of 
downstream firms located in region B to region A, until the equilibrium condition in equation 
(26) is restored. 
 
If ( ) ( )NN djdi ∆<∆ ππ , firms prefer region B and there is an incentive for the migration of 
downstream firms located in region A to region B, until the equilibrium condition in equation 
(26) is restored. 
 
Substituting the results of equations (24) and (25) in equation (26), we obtain: 
 
( )( )[ ]{ } ( )( )[ ]{ }


























( ) tttttN γγγγ 24 222222 −+=+∆−⇒  
 
So, the necessary condition for the existence of an incentive for the migration of downstream 
firms to region A is given by: 
 
























ttN  (28) 
 












ttN  (28b) 
 


















































We can say that this interior equilibrium is stable and unique. 
 
A point that should be emphasized in the previous equation is that the variable N∆  always 
has non-negative values1. Thus, we can say that the model is valid only inside the interval 
[ ]NN ;0∈∆ . This conclusion can be proved based on the boundary conditions presented in 
equations (19) to (21).  
 
From equation (20), the maximum possible value that parameter t can assume is obtained 
when we assign NN =∆ : 
 












From equation (21), the maximum possible value that parameter t can assume is obtained 
when we assign NN −=∆  and += 0γ : 
 










From equation (19), it is possible to observe that the maximum value that parameter t can 
assume in this equation is higher than the value it can assume in equation (21), since, in the 
interval [ )0;NN −∈∆ , the denominator of the former is smaller than the denominator of the 
latter: 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) NNNNN ∀∀−∆++−>+∆+++ ,;221223 γγγγγ  
 
                                                 
1 We assume that ∆N = 0, based on the limit situation when parameter γ approaches 0. In 






Based on the previous analysis, even if we substitute, in equation (28c), the maximum 
possible value for parameter t in the interval [ ]NNN ;−∈∆ , which, according to equations 
(20) and (21), is necessarily equal to 32 , the value of N∆  is always non-negative. 
 
Returning to the solution of the first stage of the game, for the case of interior equilibrium, we 
now solve equation (27) in relation to t, assuming that the downstream firms prefer region A: 
 
 
( ) 024 222 >+∆+++∆−⇒ tNNt γγγγ  
 





In order for the previous expression to be negative, it is necessary that: 
 







t  (29) 
 
The equilibrium of location of downstream firms is given by: 
 







t  (29b) 
 
2.2.3.1 – 1st stage of the game: additional analysis for the case of interior equilibrium 
 
From equation (28c), we can see how the equilibrium level N∆  changes due to variations in 
parameters t and γ , in the interval [ )NN ;0∈∆ . 
 















































⇒ γ  
 
So, if parameter t increases, and the value of parameter γ  remains unchanged, the value of 
N∆  decreases, and we can conclude that there is a migration of downstream firms from 
region A to region B. According to this, we can say that the transport cost induces dispersion 




The variation of N∆  due to variations in parameter γ  is given by: 
 
( ) ( )( )





















































From the previous expression, the following result is obtained: 
 









































In the space of parameters γ  and t, defined in the interval [ )NN ;0∈∆ , it is known from 
equation (22) that parameter t always has a value that is smaller than 2/7 (this value is 
obtained if we assign 0=∆N , 2=N  and += 0γ ). According to this, the previous expression 
is always true, since: 
 











































N  always. So, if parameterγ  increases, ceteris paribus, the 
value of N∆  also increases, and we can conclude that there is a migration of downstream 
firms from region B to region A. According to this, we can say that the transport cost of the 
intermediate good favours agglomeration closer to the supplier of the input. The two 
parameters γ  and t have opposing effects on the location of the downstream firms. 
 
  – + +   – 
  ( )7143,5;10 −−∈    ( )0;4−∈  
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2.2.4 – 1st stage of the game: extreme equilibrium 
 
Developing the solution of the first stage of the game for the case of extreme equilibrium, the 
necessary condition for the existence of a location equilibrium with all the downstream N 
firms located in only one region (in this model, in region A) is given by: 
 
( ) ( )2−=∆>=∆ NNNN djdi ππ  (30) 
 











ttNNdiπ  (31) 
 
From equation (25): 
 










γγγγπ  (32) 
 
Substituting (31) and (32) in (30), we obtain: 
 
( ) ( )( )[ ]{ } ( ) ( )( )[ ]{ }{ } 01222122122321088 222 >−−+−+++−++−−+− NtNttt γγγγ  
 













γππ  (33) 
 
Based on the previous equation, it can be seen that the lower the number of downstream firms 
in the economy and, consequently, the lower the value of N, the larger will be the region of 
the space of parameters when no firm is located in region B. If the number of downstream 
firms is increased, this region of the space of parameters becomes narrower and this allows us 
to conclude that increases in N, ceteris paribus, induce dispersion (the competition effect). 
 
Within the interval of parameter t defined in equation (33), there is no incentive for any 
downstream firm Ai∈  to move to region B, with all the existing N firms remaining located in 
region A. 
 
On the other hand, there is an incentive for one firm Ai∈  to move to region B if: 
 









γππ  (33b) 
 





2.2.5 – Equilibrium stability – further analysis 
 
The stability and uniqueness of the interior equilibrium was previously proved, according to 
equation (28c). In this section, we show that the profit differential dj
d
i ππ −  is a decreasing 
function on N∆ . In order to show this, we develop the analysis ( ) ( )Ndjdi ∆∂−∂ ππ . Based on 



































































Based on this result, we have proved once more that the firms’ geographical equilibrium of 
location is stable. 
 
3 – Results for an economy with 50 downstream firms 
 
In this section, we develop the results for an economy in which there is a monopolist 
upstream firm and 50 downstream firms, which choose to locate in region A or B. 
 
Based on equations (22) for [ ]48;0∈∆N  and (23) for 50=∆N , we can define all the upper 
borders of the space of parameters where all the typical firms Ai∈  and Bj∈  are producing 
for both regions. Also, based on equations (29b) for [ ]48;0∈∆N  and (33) for 50=∆N , we 
can define the full set of equilibria for the location of downstream firms. In the following 
figure, these upper borders and the equilibrium curves for [ ]50;0∈∆N  are presented. The 
segments of the equilibrium curves above their intersections with the corresponding upper 
borders of the space of parameters will be ignored, since the boundary conditions 
0;;; **** >jbjaibia qqqq  do not hold simultaneously: 
 
[Insert figure 1] 
 
In the previous figure, the equilibrium curve for 0=∆N  is not presented because when we 
have the same number of downstream firms located in both regions, which means that 
0=∆N , the equilibrium curve is located completely outside the region of the space of 
parameters where all the downstream firms are producing for both regions. This result was in 
fact already expected since, in equation (28c), we assumed that N∆  was non-negative only if 
the limit case was considered in which parameter γ approaches zero. Also, the upper border 
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for 50=∆N , which is defined by the curve 32=t  according to equation (23), is not 
presented because of the scale of the chart. 
 
Based on the chart of the previous figure, it is possible, through the positions of the 
equilibrium curves plotted from different values of N∆ ,  to see the results of the model 
obtained in section 2.2.3.1, in which we noted how the equilibrium level N∆  changes due to 
variations in parameters t and γ , in the interval [ )NN ;0∈∆ . It can be observed that, for 
constant values of the transport cost t, as γ  increases, the value of N∆  also increases, which 
means that an incentive is created for the migration of downstream firms from region B to 
region A. This graphical result is in accordance with the analytical model, which defined in 






N ; always 
 
Intuitively, this mathematical result can be interpreted in the following manner: since the final 
consumer markets in both regions A and B are symmetrical, when there is an increase in the 
value of parameter γ  (and consequently, in the transport cost of the input) and while the other 
conditions affecting the economy are kept unchanged, the downstream firms are affected by a 
force attracting them to region A. This occurs because, although the upstream firm is 
responsible for the transport of the input, when γ  increases, this growth affects the input price 
charged to the downstream firms located in region B, according to equation (14), while the 
input price charged to downstream firms located in region A remains unchanged, according to 
equation (13). Another way to see this analysis is through equations (24) and (25), which 
represent the profit functions of the typical firms Ai∈  and Bj∈ . These are repeated below: 
 













In the previous equation, we can see that if γ  increases, with all the rest remaining 
unchanged, both terms ( )( )[ ]{ }2212 +∆−++ γNNt  and ( )( )[ ]{ }2232 γ−∆−+− NNt  also 
increase, which means that the profit of the typical firms Ai∈  increases. For the typical firms 
Bj∈ , the inverse holds true, as can be seen through their profit function: 
 











γγγγπ   
 
In the previous equation, when γ  increases, with all the rest remaining unchanged, both terms 
( ) ( )( )[ ]{ }22232 +∆+++− γγ NNt  and ( ) ( )( )[ ]{ }22212 NNt ∆+−+−+ γγ  decrease, leading to 
a fall in profits. 
 
In the chart of Figure 1, it can also be seen that, for constant values of γ , when the transport 
cost t increases, the value of N∆  decreases, which means that an incentive is created for the 
migration of downstream firms from region A to region B. This graphical result is in 
accordance with the analytical model, which defined in section 2.2.3.1 that: 
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∆∂ γ  
 
Intuitively, this mathematical result is more complicated to interpret than the previous one 
because variations in parameter t are associated with two opposing effects, one of them being 
a force attracting firms to region A and the other a force attracting firms to region B. Increases 
in parameter t are reflected in an increase in the transport cost of the input, creating a force 
that attracts the downstream firms to region A, where the upstream firm is located. On the 
other hand, an incentive is also created for the dispersion of downstream firms in order to 
reduce competition and locate close to the local final consumers. Particularly in this model, 
where there are always more downstream firms in region A than in region B, the incentive to 
reduce competition is an ever-present reality. The overall effect of these two opposing forces, 
according to the chart and the analytical model, is that the incentive to reduce competition is 
stronger than the incentive for agglomeration in one region. One issue that should be 
highlighted in this result is that, in contrast to the work of MAYER (2000), in the analysis of 
the trade-off between the minimization of the production cost and the maximization of 
accessibility to final consumers, the downstream firms give more importance to the latter. A 
possible explanation for this is that MAYER (2000) only considered a duopoly in his model 
and the competition effect that favours dispersion was not as apparent as in this generalized 
model with N firms. The results of our model are in line with VENABLES (1996), where a 
very high trade cost led to a unique and stable equilibrium, characterized by the dispersion of 
downstream firms. 
 
4 – Conclusion 
 
This paper made an analysis of the geographical equilibrium of location of downstream firms 
and its relation with the creation of an industrial cluster. We considered the effects on this 
equilibrium of transport costs, vertical linkage between downstream and upstream firms and 
competition. Three main results were obtained. The first one showed that when there are 
increases in the transport cost of the input, downstream firms prefer to agglomerate in the 
region where the upstream firm is located in order to obtain savings in the production cost. On 
the other hand, increases in the general transport cost or in the number of downstream firms 
lead to a dispersion of the latter in order to reduce competition and locate closer to the local 
final consumer. The second result is that N∆  is never a negative value, which means that it is 
not possible for there to be a larger industrial cluster in region B than in region A. If we 
imagine that the input supplier can be compared to a firm which holds a patent or a new 
advanced technology, this result shows the difficulty that the less developed countries have in 
becoming an attractive location for an industrial cluster. The third and final result showed that 
the effect of globalization, through which transport (trade) costs tend to be reduced, is 
hazardous for the peripheral region. Here, the notion of periphery can be associated with the 
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Figure 1 – Equilibrium of location curves (black) and upper borders of the space of 
parameters (grey) where all fifty downstream firms are producing for both regions, according 
to different values of N∆ . 
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